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Abstract 
During the late twentieth century, the United Kingdom’s football infrastructure and 
spectatorship underwent transformation as successive stadia disasters heightened political 
and public scrutiny of the game and prompted industry change. Central to this process was 
the government’s formation of an independent charitable organisation to oversee 
subsequent policy implementation and grant-aid provision to clubs for safety, crowd and 
spectator requirements. This entity, which began in 1975 focusing on ground improvement, 
developed into the Football Trust. The Trust was funded directly by the football pools 
companies who ran popular low-stakes football betting enterprises. Working in association 
with the Pools Promoters Association [PPA], and demonstrating their social responsibility 
toward the games’ constituents, the pools resourced a wide array of Trust activities. Yet, 
irrespective of government mandate, the PPA and Trust were continually confronted by 
political and economic obstacles that threatened the effectiveness of their arrangements. In 
this paper I investigate the history of the Football Trust, its partnership with the PPA, and, 
relationship with the government within the context of broader political shifts, stadia 
catastrophes, official inquiries and commercial threats. I contend that while the Trust/PPA 
partnership had a respectable legacy, their history afforded little protection against adverse 
contemporary conditions.  
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Introduction  
Since its inception in 1975 the Football Trust was the lead protagonist in providing 
charitable assistance to the United Kingdom’s (UK) football clubs. Aided by financial 
benefactions from the nation’s football pools companies, the Trust developed a successful 
track record as an agent of change. The existence of the Trust also demonstrated how the 
popularity football (as evinced through pools patronage) and the commercial enterprises of 
the pools companies (represented by the Pools Promoters Association [PPA]) could be 
utilised for the betterment of the game and its constituents. Providing aid following stadia 
disasters in the 1980s further consolidated the organisation’s reputation. In 1989/1990 the 
Trust’s abilities were tested again with the Hillsborough stadium tragedy and the 
subsequent release of Lord Justice Peter Taylor’s inquiry (detailed shortly). The events were 
a definitive moment for the UK’s football industry,1 yet, for the Trust they also demarcated 
the start of a new historical chapter. A key element of this was the redevelopment of the 
antecedent Football Trust and its partner organisation, the Football Grounds Improvement 
Trust (FGIT), to more effectively oversee implementation of Lord Taylor’s reforms 
(colloquially known as ‘Taylor work’).  
 The Trust’s reformation also coincided with a moment of distinct political change; 
namely the exit of Margaret Thatcher and entrance of John Major as head of the 
Conservative government. Throughout the 1980s the Trust had operated within the context 
of Thatcher’s administration which, while generally supportive of the Trust’s work, was 
critical of the degradation of football and its spectatorship culture, and, unsympathetic to 
the PPA’s calls for taxation relief to support its charitable donations.2 The Trust relied on 
contributions secured from the pools industry. The viability of this arrangement was 
contingent on the pools industry protecting their businesses from competition and any 
threats to income generation. As such, during the 1980s the PPA lobbied the government to 
protect the pools industry. Foremost of their concerns was securing tax deduction 
(specifically via a reduction in pool betting duty [RPBD] that currently stood at 42.5%), and, 
preventing the imposition of a national lottery scheme. The former directly carved into the 
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pools companies’ profit margins and their ability to provide the Trust with sufficient funds 
for football work, while the latter presented a formidable counter enterprise that drastically 
reduced pools income.  
The trio of incidents in the late 1980s at Bradford, Heysel and Hillsborough helped 
the Trust’s legitimacy by demonstrating their commitment to improving football’s 
infrastructure and spectatorship;3 however, struggles with the government persisted. RPBD 
lobbying continued, for example and the introduction of the National Lottery went ahead in 
1994. Promises, hope and potential salvation came in May 1997 in the form of Tony Blair’s 
new Labour government that, amongst other agendas, heralded new socially transformative 
policies (including favourable approaches to the nation’s sport culture, patronage, and 
development).4 Invariably, Blair’s government represented an optimistic boost to the 
morale and future of the Trust and the PPA. However, while the organisations’ members 
may have felt an improvement in their relationship with the government was forthcoming, 
political assurances about their future could not be guaranteed. Nor, for that matter, could 
its members foresee that the eventual outcome would be transformation of the Trust, 
dismay among its members, changes to the partnership between the Trust and the PPA, the 
rise of the national lottery and the pools industry’s slow demise.    
 The relationship between the Football Trust, PPA and government during the 1990s 
is, thus, significant in highlighting the extent to which those working for ‘the good of game’ 
went to protect their efforts and investments. Moreover, with regards to the PPA, the 
period of turbulence experienced circa.1990-1997 is also demonstrative of the ways in 
which corporate stakeholders (in this case, pools companies) not only tried to protect their 
income generation, but also, endeavoured to maintain their capacity to fulfil philanthropic 
obligations and commitment to socially responsible enterprises. It is this period of activity 
that this paper takes as its focal point. While previous scholarship has focused on changes to 
UK’s football culture and spectatorship during the 1980s, and, how the football fraternity 
responded to the stadia disasters and governmental criticism of the sport during the era,5 
the roles of the PPA and Trust at this historical juncture have not received significant 
attention. The paper also contributes to an emergent interest in analysing the political 
influences on sport trusts and the associated role of football supporter trusts.6 The paper 
adds to these assessments in particular by underscoring the complex intersections between 
3 
 
central government, prevailing economic conditions, and political agendas within the 
charitable and professional football sectors.  
In what follows I examine the legacy of the Football Trust, its renovation in 1990, 
and, the development of its relationship with the government in the post-Hillsborough era. I 
also consider the roles the PPA played in this process; in particular by attempting to 
preserve their financial support to the Trust through lobbying for RPBD and holding the 
government to account for the consequences of the National Lottery. I then discuss the 
spirit of optimism and opportunities afforded to the PPA and Trust by the commencement 
of the Labour government in 1997, and, the results this had for continued operations. I 
argue that while the PPA and Trust enjoyed a respectable reputation being at the forefront 
of profound industry change, any historical capital this may have garnered offered a weak 
defence against being blindsided by a set of contemporary circumstances in the political 
present (e.g. largely unforeseen or unrealised commercial threats, government redirections, 
or personal conflicts). To underscore its social and political value to the football industry, 
and the UK’s sport culture writ large, I begin by outlining a history of the Trust.  
 
The genesis of the Trust and reinvigoration in tragedy  
The Football Trust began, primarily, in response to the combined forces of the Ibrox stadium 
disaster in 1971, the consequent Wheatley Report in 1972 and the government’s 
introduction of the Safety of Sports Ground Act in 1975. On the 2nd of January 1971 a fatal 
crush incident occurred in a stairwell at Rangers’ home ground of Ibrox stadium, Glasgow, 
during a match with rivals Celtic. The event led to the deaths of 66 people and injury to over 
200 others.7 Fatal incidents at football grounds had occurred previously;8 however, the 
significant scale of the event on this occasion prompted clearer political action on stadia 
conditions and spectator safety. The government followed with an inquiry chaired by Sir 
Norman Wheatley to examine existing stadia safety arrangements and improvements in the 
context of current law or potential legislative changes.9 Among its various recommendations 
across infrastructure, safety, policing and administration, the Wheatley Report encouraged 
the adoption of a rigorous stadia licensing system for all UK football clubs. The initiative 
would not only ensure a tighter safety compliance regime among the sport’s clubs, but also, 
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provide a legally binding set of quality standards for stadia and reassurance for club patrons. 
To this end, in 1972 the Conservative government tabled the Safety of Sports Ground (SSG) 
bill. Given the range of stakeholders involved in the game (e.g. the government, Football 
Association [FA], Football League [FL], club owners, local authorities, football patrons, 
businesses and the PPA), and the concomitant issue of determining where the onus of 
responsibility for change lay, there was considerable debate over the appropriate funding 
mechanism. The indecision delayed the bill’s introduction until 1974 when the Labour 
government resumed office and sports minister Denis Howell expedited its ratification.10 
Central to the implementation of the Act was formation of an independent and official 
body, the Football Grounds Improvement Trust, resourced using funds (approximately £8 
million per annum) redirected from the football pools’ popular ‘Spot-The-Ball’ (STB) 
competition.11  
The Trust’s remit was to operate an extensive grant-aid system to support clubs in 
their efforts to comply with the SSGA 1975; with particular emphasis on countering anti-
social behaviour, and, facility and ground improvements. In addition, the Trust was also 
empowered to support relevant projects at the community and club levels.12 With the PPA 
providing the financial foundations, the FGIT began a vigorous campaign, initially within 
football’s first and second divisions, to rejuvenate the UK’s football landscape and bring 
about shifts in spectator attitudes and behaviour. The establishment of the Trust signified 
the government’s most concerted effort up until that point to attend to the needs of the 
game and its constituents. Its formation was also an additional acknowledgement that 
although the morality of the gambling industry had been historically criticised,13 the pools 
could be utilised to affect good causes for the game.  
In 1979, and in partial response to government’s Royal Commission on Gambling,14 
the PPA and the FGIT came under further discussion. Critical of the links between the 
profitability of gambling, taxation levels and commitments of the industry to social 
responsibility, the report noted the work of the FGIT as a good example of how betting 
revenue could be appropriately invested. The report was praiseworthy of the FGIT, yet it 
belied the fact that since its inception the PPA had ardently lobbied the government for tax 
reductions that would better enable the Pools businesses to support philanthropic 
enterprises. Consequently, following further government discussions, the Trust’s scope was 
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extended and the funding arrangements altered. Foremost of the changes was the 
separation of the FGIT work from the Trust’s other football-related social work, community 
development and research projects. While the FGIT was still responsible for overseeing 
stadia and ground infrastructure and safety work at the upper levels of the game, a separate 
overarching entity, the Football Trust, would provide and extend grant-aid throughout the 
football strata. The broadened scale of activities were funded by a marginal increase in the 
Pools donations to the Trust (essentially, now 21% of STB turnover) which amounted to a 
revised total income for the Football Trusts of approximately £4million per year. The new 
arrangement made it easier for the Trusts to facilitate a much wider schedule of activities 
across the UK. Though, with 40,000 football clubs around the UK all in various states of 
structural and financial need the Trust’s resources were stretched. The PPA tried to ensure 
favourable economic conditions for pools companies that would, in turn, enable their 
continued Trust contributions, however, in 1979 they were confronted by a political shift 
with the onset of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government. While noting the work of 
the Trusts, the Conservative party were unable to entertain the PPA’s calls for reductions in 
the betting duty (which in 1979 remained at 42.5%). The fiscal conditions set by the 
government may have provided a challenge, yet it did not distract the Trust or PPA from 
their football obligations.  
 
The 1980s, the return of disaster and the reassertion of legitimacy  
For the first half of the 1980s the Trusts worked efficiently and effectively, redistributing 
pools contributions toward a range of initiatives. Grant-aid activities included, variously: 
funds for specific target populations (e.g., small cities, low socio-economic areas or under-
resourced communities), pitch and facility upgrades and replacements, community 
engagement projects, non-league club work, civic and transport developments, and 
research support.15 In conjunction with the FA, for example, the Trust provided a 
£1.45million investment in all-weather pitches. In addition, they supported upgrades to the 
country’s international-class stadiums in London, Glasgow and Belfast, cooperated with 
local authorities to improve train station and stadia connections, and, provided 
approximately £6.2 million for the installation of CCTV at grounds across the UK.16 The Trust 
also upheld its commitment to the centre for football research which they had been 
6 
 
complicit in founding at Leicester University. All this was valuable, welcome, and in many 
cases vital, work. Ibrox may have provided the initial impetus for the Trust’s endeavours; 
but, by the mid-1980s it was evident that organisation had considerable utility beyond 
merely being just a funding conduit and arbiter of clubs’ safety-related needs. Over 10 years 
the Trusts implemented a football development scheme on a scale not previously 
experienced, and in so doing, evidenced their credibility and legitimacy as a key industry 
protagonist. As noteworthy as this transformation to the game may have been, calls for 
grant-aid did not abate and the Trusts’ resources remained strained. Notwithstanding the 
challenging economic conditions set by Conservative government,17 PPA and Trust members 
had shown resilience and fortitude. Yet, as the decade progressed they were confronted by 
events that tested the partnership, prompted changes to the Trusts’ structure, and, 
exacerbated government tussles.  
 The first event was the Bradford stadium fire on the 11th May 1985 that resulted in 
the deaths of 56 people and injury to 265.18 The Bradford fatality led to the establishment of 
an inquiry chaired by Lord Oliver Popplewell. The commission had barely begun its work 
when on the 29th May 38 fans died and around 400 were injured during a crush incident at 
the European Cup final against Italian team Juventus at Brussel’s Heysel stadium.19 
Popplewell’s eventual reports, which took into account both disasters, detailed an extensive 
set of recommendations traversing fire precautions, health and safety provision, policing, 
crowd control, administrative responsibilities, stadia certification and compliance, anti-
social behaviour prevention, and communication measures.20 Popplewell cited the Trusts’ 
support of football; however, he noted that in spite of concerted efforts to improve safety 
standards more still needed to be done.21 Moreover, financial constraints still existed at the 
club level (and also with the Trust) that made it difficult for the required work to be 
undertaken in an expedient and proficient manner.  
With the recognised knowledge, record and strategic position to oversee 
Popplewell’s recommendations, for nearly three years the PPA and Trusts laboured to 
change football safety and spectator culture. Then, on April 15th 1989, the UK was struck by 
the third football tragedy of the decade. During a FA Cup semi-final match between 
Nottingham Forest and Liverpool at Sheffield Wednesbury’s Hillsborough stadium a crush 
occurred that resulted in the deaths of 96 people and injury to 776.22 Similar to the sport’s 
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other fatal incidents, the severity of the Hillsborough disaster reverberated throughout the 
UK and wider football fraternity. The government responded by establishing a Royal 
Commission of Inquiry chaired by Lord Justice Peter Taylor. In addition to undertaking a 
thorough analysis of incident, the commission also considered Hillsborough in light of the 
broader context of the sport.23 Thus in addition to detailing the mechanics of the 
catastrophe, Taylor was able to comment on administration and management, fan culture, 
alcohol, surveillance mechanisms, club leadership, finances, SSG Act 1975 and Safety of 
Places of Sport Act 1987 compliance, ticketing and membership, and, the community impact 
of the sport in general. When the final released on the January 18th 1990, the report 
comprised some 76 recommendations covering practical stadia and crowd concerns as well 
as cultural, political, economic and social factors.24 
 The Taylor Report consolidated a series of profound concerns about the state of 
football; especially with regards to the game’s cultural identity and its popular image, and, 
its social and political contributions. Of particular importance, certainly as far as the Trusts 
and the PPA were involved, was that the Taylor report had underscored the vital necessity 
of supporting infrastructural improvement and social development work throughout all 
levels of the sport. To this end, Taylor complimented the FGIT and Football Trust who, he 
acknowledged had been instrumental in overseeing a large scale of activities (in particular, 
CCTV installation, improved policing, and academic research support) for the betterment of 
the game.25 Although the report presented the Trusts positively, it also highlighted that the 
scale of Taylor’s recommendations (particularly ensuring all clubs meet necessary 
compliance standards) would require substantial financing that would likely exhaust the 
Trusts’ healthy, but still relatively small, funds.26  
 Having an established record as a grant-aid provider, and, a respected role in 
transforming the game’s physical spaces, the Trusts were Taylor’s organisation of choice. Of 
all the stakeholders in the game, the Trusts had the best capacity and ability to manage 
Taylor work. Although the Trusts accepted their involvement, adequate resourcing 
remained a concern. Taylor’s suggestion was for money to be obtained from within the 
pools industry and to a lesser extent the football authorities, which had all benefited 
significantly from the game already.27 For the PPA (whose ideas were echoed by the FA and 
Trusts), one of the most obvious sources remained the government reducing the pool 
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betting duty. A reduction of 2.5% (from the current rate of 42.5%), the PPA argued, could 
provide approximately a further £16 million per year for Trust activities and Taylor work. 
Considering the estimated 10-year implementation period for Taylor work and the 
hypothesised £100 million total investment that was required,28 a constant and reliable 
income stream was clearly needed. Concomitant with funding, however, what the PPA and 
Trusts also required were amiable political conditions that attended to the PPA’s concerns 
regarding its commercial viability, and, recognised the pools companies’ sustained 
commitment to football philanthropy.  
 
Post-Hillsborough, Reconsolidation and threats made manifest 
Since inception the Trusts had operated successfully within the context of their respective 
remits of aiding ground improvement and club, community and social development 
projects. The foremost consequences of Hillsborough and the Taylor report, however, was a 
swift and substantial increase in the Trusts’ workload. Yet, the extensive nature of Taylor 
work and the government and industry expectations placed upon the organisations in the 
post-Hillsborough context, made the split Trust arrangements seem inefficient and counter-
productive. Thus, shortly after the Taylor report was released, and with government 
backing, the work of the FGIT and Football Trust was consolidated into one entity; the 
Football Trust (1990).29 The reintegration effectively streamlined administration and 
financial procedures, reaffirmed solidarity with the PPA and Pools companies, provided a 
stronger political voice, and, better equipped the Trust in its football work and new Taylor-
related imperatives.30  
 Consolidation fortified the Trust, but, they were afforded further assistance by 
governmental changes that shifted (if albeit slightly) the prevailing political current. In the 
government’s 1990 budget, in the first instance, Chancellor John Major began by supporting 
a RPBD decrease to 40% on the condition that the reduction specifically was used for Taylor 
work.31 The alteration would potentially yield a further £20 million over the next 5 years.32 
The second turn came when Major replaced Thatcher as Prime minister in November 1990. 
Major’s succession precipitated a closer dialogue between the government, Trust and PPA. 
However, Hillsborough and Taylor-work pressures continued to place football, its 
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stakeholders and spectators under considerable scrutiny, and in particular, the Trust under 
perpetual pressure to validate its existence and utility in enabling football improvements.33 
Although RPBD concerns may have been central to the PPA and Trust’s governmental 
parlays in the early 1990s, a further lingering fear began to materialise. That specific danger 
was the advent of a national lottery scheme.   
 The notion of a government-backed national lottery scheme (effectively a UK-wide, 
low-stakes, betting initiative to compete with the pools) had been present for a 
considerable time.34 The Government’s intention may not have necessarily been for the 
national lottery to specifically compete with the Trust’s activities; nonetheless, the Trust and 
PPA clearly saw the lottery as a competitor who had the potential to disrupt their business 
and the sustainability of their future activities within and beyond football. As early as 1968, 
for example, the PPA expressed concerns that the idea represented a threat to the pools 
and that efforts would be made to dissuade the government from taking this course.35 At 
the time, the PPA’s efforts worked and, on account of lacking the force of a dedicated body 
of protagonists such as the pools enjoyed, the national lottery concept retreated into 
relative dormancy. With the 1970s came government changes (as detailed above) and the 
fateful events at Ibrox. All of these, inadvertently or otherwise, detracted attention from the 
national lottery; or, at the very least, produced conditions in which the PPA’s philanthropy, 
and latterly the FGIT and Trust’s work, gained political credence and public 
acknowledgement. Toward the later part of the 1970s, however, and amidst the context of 
the Royal Commission on Gambling, the national lottery concept re-emerged.36    
 By the 1980s PPA members had already noted general down-turn in pools business; 
largely hastened by increased payments to the FA and FL for fixture lists, rising postal prices, 
administrative and management obligations, and, a generally crowded and competitive 
gambling market place.37 As such, and mindful of the Royal Commission’s general 
endorsement of an overarching lottery scheme, the PPA moved to advance their cause.38 
Even before the release of the commission’s formal report the PPA began lobbying the 
government to first halt the lottery, but if that proved unsuccessful, ensure that operation 
of the lottery would be placed in the PPA’s hands. Again, the association achieved a small 
triumph. While a lotteries council was established to oversee existing small lotteries 
businesses, the imposition of a national initiative failed to materialise. Integral to the 
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success of PPA in being able to parry criticism of the pools and fend of the National Lottery 
up to the latter part of the decade was leverage the Trust’s work provided in evidencing the 
industry’s sustained and wide-reaching commitment to social responsibility.39 By 1990, 
however, with Thatcher’s resignation, there was new political climate in which national 
lottery enthusiasts and the PPA could advance their causes.  
For the next four years the PPA (aided significantly by Richard Faulkner, the Football 
Trust’s Deputy Chairman, as their parliamentary advocate and advisor) worked vigorously to 
destabilise the national lottery while simultaneously reaffirming the Pool’s national utility.40 
Key to the PPA’s case was highlighting the legacy of the Trust and their current government 
arrangement to facilitate Taylor work. The STB funds, for example, now provided the Trust 
with approximately £12 million a year; £9 million of which was set aside for essential safety 
and improvement work at the upper levels of UK football. By 1992 the Trust had also 
provided £120 million in grants toward the professional game.41 Moreover, in just two years 
the Trust had committed a further approximately £53 million in major project aid covering 
club administration, national stadia investment, policing and surveillance, and, safety and 
improvement grants.42 In addition, the PPA could also claim their contributions to additional 
investments in the game (for example, the building and refurbishment of new grounds and 
stand, provision of family, disability and community facilities, CCTV initiatives, and in excess 
of £40 million allocated to non-professional football and the sports grassroots).43 The PPA 
and Trust may have still been able to fortify their case with a legacy of development work in 
general; however, the high profile nature of Hillsborough and the Taylor report was timely 
in adding substantial moral and social weight to their cause. 
 With such a strong history of service to the game the Trust and PPA might have been 
lulled into complacency. However, the National Lottery lobby persisted. By late 1991 and 
early 1992 the PPA were forced to fight harder and seek higher profile for the pools 
companies.44 PPA members soon found themselves in battle with a formidable opposition 
and the mood among the association was invariably one of great concern. “It was agreed, 
basically”, the association minutes reported, “that there was still a need to get the message 
over that the Pro National Lottery Lobbyists are still disseminating misleading ‘facts’ and 
information and we should pursue with vigour the policy of correction”.45 A further obstacle 
was also placed in the PPA’s ways with the release of the Government’s white paper on the 
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gambling and lottery industry also placed way by advocating for tighter political controls and 
regulations on the industry.46 With the paper, and irrespective of their previous praise for 
the Trust, the PPA also realised the Conservative government remained strongly in favour of 
the National lottery and had placed it high on their campaign agenda for the 1992 general 
election.47 Although the PPA and Trust persevered with their case, their best hope rested in 
the potential of a political change to Labour that could have quashed (or at least diminished) 
the extent of the National Lottery and its consequences.  
Irrespective of the PPA’s concerted effort to prevent, suspend, and in the end 
mitigate the effects of its introduction, the Conservatives return to office in 1992 effectively 
made the National Lottery’s entrance a fait accompli. Although the survival of pools and 
subsequent ability of the Trust to do Taylor work remained in jeopardy, the partners looked 
upon their defeat strategically. Essentially, the organisations seized the opportunity to 
retain a close relationship with the government as an industry expert, and, be a constructive 
party within National Lottery establishment discussions. Central to the PPA’s logic, and in a 
seemingly last-ditch effort to protect the pools collective, was the idea that if the National 
Lottery progressed the Trust was best placed to manage the operation.48 Having been 
opposed to the lottery for so long this position was, invariably, met with some trepidation. 
“We cannot be seen to be running with the hare and chasing with the hounds”, the Trust 
noted, “We must be careful not to be too virulent in our opposition to the concept of a 
National Lottery and then at the same time be too enthusiastic over our proposal to run 
it”.49 Although the PPA and Trust continued their opposition (buoyed by a barrage of 
support from the wider football industry), over the course of the next two years the nature 
of discussions changed. In particular, when the government selected the betting outfit 
Camelot to run the lottery, and, the date for the first draw was set for November 24 1994, 
the PPA’s strategy turned away from prevention and resistance toward negotiation and 
mitigation. The PPA received some help in 1994 when the RPBD was set at 37.5% (largely in 
aid of protecting the continuation of Taylor work).  
  The PPA persistently lobbied the government for relief, but, to no avail. “We had 
hoped that by the time the lottery started its operation the terms of competition between it 
and pools would have been fair and level”, the PPA wrote in plea to the Department of 
National Heritage’s Arts and Lottery Committee, though,  
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We regret that that is not the case, and are mystified why the Government continues 
to deny the pools companies the opportunity to advertise on television and radio, 
given the lottery’s stated intention to spend tens of millions on these media. We 
remain extremely concerned therefore PPA members’ businesses may still be 
seriously damaged by unfair competition from the national lottery.50 
As had been suspected by the PPA, the consequences of the National Lottery were swift and 
severe. In the first instance, income from both the RPBD and STB fell by 50%. By 1995/96 
the former had been reduced by 40% and the latter 66% from their pre-lottery levels. Prior 
to the lottery the Trust had received approximately £22.6 million from the RPBD and a 
further £14 million from STB. However, due to profit falls Littlewoods (the primary pools 
company) was forced to reduce their standard donation rate (that had for considerable time 
remained at 20-21%) to 15%, and then, in late 1996 to just 10%. Littlewoods also forecast 
continual decline for their foreseeable future. The corollary for the Trust was that RBPD 
income fell by 1996 to approximately £13 million and STB funds to just £4 million per 
annum. By 1997/98 the predictions were for the respective contributions to fall further to 
£11 million and £3 million.51 Additional strain came with the government’s mandate that 
the Trust extend its Taylor work to clubs at all levels of the game (an exercise that expected 
to cost in the vicinity of £200 million for the remainder of the implementation plan to 
1999/2000). Combined, the events left the trust with a projected shortfall of between £33-
55 million over the next 5-6 years.  
The short sharp shock the lottery had on the pools caused considerable dismay and 
frustration among PPA and Trust members. Littlewoods, for example, wrote directly to John 
Major advising him that they would be no longer able to sustain their sizeable contributions 
to the Trust and would have to eventually cease their STB donation. “It is our duty”, the 
pools company wrote, “to protect our business and the future of our employees and this 
must be our overriding consideration”.52 “The Football Trust has done tremendous work 
over the years in improving facilities and safety in football grounds”, Littlewoods wrote to 
the Trust, and “…there is still more to do in order to complete the implementation of the 
Taylor Report. We are therefore sad to see the Trust’s income fall so substantially”.53 As 
Trust chairman, Lord Aberdare, reported at the end of 1996, the organisation was in crisis 
and effectively “had no choice but to review its commitments to national stadia projects. 
[And] the government should be asked to take over the Trust’s commitments to the national 
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stadia from lottery funds”.54 Aberdare added the present conditions had been created by 
the current government and they “must accept responsibility for helping the Trust which 
was implementing government policy”.55 Mindful of the wealth that circulated in football’s 
professional realms the Trust also argued that the PPA held an unfair share of the economic 
burden, and, that other football stakeholders (such as the Premier League and Football 
League) should be called upon to increase their assistance.56 “There is a widespread 
perception that football”, Trust members noted, “and the following successive television 
and commercial sponsorship deals is awash with money. And so it is, at the very top of the 
game. Life in the lower divisions is another world. Here the proper implementation of Taylor 
will not take place without significant Trust grant support”.57 Difficult as the situation may 
have been, the PPA and Trust remained committed to their cause and persisted with 
government lobbying. The association and Trust were not, however, oblivious to the 
prevailing political climate, and, like others elsewhere, anticipated a government change at 
the forthcoming election.  
 
The allure of new Labour and a rescue  
Signs of a political turn may have been evident for some time prior,58 but for the PPA and 
Football Trust by late-1996/early-1997 there was certainly a strong belief (and hope) that 
governmental change was forthcoming. Realistically, and as had occurred previously, the 
duo had to be prepared for whatever the political outcome. The Conservative government 
had not exactly produced the most favourable working environment, nor, fully 
acknowledged the substantial work the organisations had done for the good of the game in 
what were (specifically after the National Lottery) very adversarial commercial conditions. 
As such, the PPA and Trust recognised a strategic opportunity to leverage fresh political 
support and salvage what remained of the Pools enterprise and Trust’s economic viability. 
That hope came in the form of Tony Blair, his party’s New Labour campaign, and the backing 
of Tom Pendry (the then shadow-minister for sport). Prior to the general election Trust 
members worked with Pendry (and also with members of the Conservative government) to 
advance their case.  
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In mid-January 1997, for example, Faulkner wrote to Sir Terence Burns (Permanent 
Treasury Secretary) outlining the dire situation the PPA and Trust now found itself in. “Our 
over-riding objective is to safeguard the future of the Trust”, Faulkner wrote,  
as it still has important work to do not only in helping clubs to complete the Taylor 
task but also in continuing with the priorities of safety and improvements…[yet] it is 
inconceivable that the Trust could play a significant part in this process without 
substantial additional income. And with the loss of the Spot the Ball money, what it 
has from RPBD will in future have to cover safety and other improvements, as well as 
Taylor.59 
The Trust called upon Pendry to voice their concerns to the House of Commons and lobby 
Iain Sproat, Conservative minister for sport, on their behalf. “Already”, Pendry lamented to 
Sproat, “the Football Trust has seen a fall in its income of nearly two-thirds as a result of the 
decline in business of the pools companies and this is before the advent of the second week 
of the lottery draw”.60 By way of a solution, Pendry challenged the Conservative 
government to adopt stronger support for the Trust, and, work collectively toward salvaging 
pools from the consequences of the National Lottery. Governmental support, Pendry 
believed, would spurn concomitant investment in the Trust from the sports other key 
stakeholders (namely, the Football Association and the Football League).61 As persistent as 
Pendry was, Sproat remained resistant. “Football”, Sproat replied, “does not need 
preferential treatment to benefit from the lottery”.62 Sproat’s remarks were later 
underscored by Prime Minister, John Major. “I would foresee no difficulty if the English 
Sports Council were to use the undoubted expertise the Football Trust has built up over the 
years to advise on Lottery applications”, Major argued,  
…However, I remain unconvinced of the case for Lottery distributor status for the 
Trust. We already have Lottery distributors for sport in the form of the home country 
Sports Councils. I think the sports community would consider it invidious for football 
to continue to be singled out for special treatment, particularly once Taylor 
requirement are met. Other sports could justifiably demand similar treatment.63 
These sentiments were also echoed in the public sphere by the likes of Denis Vaughan, 
ardent pro-lottery campaigner, who at the same time was working to challenge the 
perceived monopoly of the Trust on charitable pools monies.64  
Facing such opposition the Trust increased their activity. Aberdare, for example, 
wrote directly to Blair reaffirming the organisation’s legacy and its vital role as football’s 
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grant-aid awarding body.65 Grateful for Labour support, Aberdare continued the 
correspondence. “I believe we have gone about our work efficiently and effectively and we 
wish to continue to do so”, Aberdare wrote,  
Our annual income at some £9m is now a quarter of what it was at its pre-national 
lottery level and if our future is to be secured we need new resources…We ask for no 
privileged position for football we simply contend that, knowing the game, we are 
the ideal vehicle for administering football’s fair share of the money the lottery 
makes available for sport.66 
Labour’s shadow-Chancellor, Gordon Brown, also offered support for the idea to have the 
Trust be a named lottery distributor, and, to have the Premier League play a greater role in 
aiding the Trust’s work.67 It helped, too, that the PPA also approached Brown regarding the 
perpetual effects of the lottery and the necessity of RBPD decreases.68   
The culmination of their pre-election efforts came when Labour released its Sporting 
Nation and A new framework for football manifestos.69 Both documents were 
complimentary of the Trust, and, detailed measures to better protect the charity and its 
financial arrangements. Foremost of Labour’s plans was to place on record its policy 
intentions to have the Trust be a named lottery recipient.70 In advocating for change within 
football, however, Labour was also cogniscent of the role the governments were required to 
play in keeping the industry in check. “Every year government contributes millions of 
pounds by way of tax concessions to football via the Football Trust”, Blair wrote, and as 
such, “it has a responsibility to ensure that this money is spent prudently”.71 Consequently, 
the party promised to support the Trust, and, guarantee efforts to challenge current pools 
betting legislation (in particular by restoring the RPBD to 32.5%).72 Football, and indeed the 
Trust, was not the only (sporting) priority in the political battle (other concerns included the 
paucity and inequalities of funding grass-roots and elite sport, criticism of the governmental 
administration structures for sport, lack of revenue sources for capital investment in sport, 
and depleted resourcing of school sport) (REF - policy). However, persistent lobbying and 
correspondence had clearly afforded it a pronounced place in policy discussion and 
development as the political tide turned.  
 
The aftermath  
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Labour won the election on May 1st 1997 with Blair replacing John Major as Prime minister. 
Following the election result, the Trust and PPA worked quickly to ensure the new 
government came good on its promises. What they did not foresee, however, was a change 
in Blair’s ministry that saw Tom Pendry replaced with Tony Banks as the new minister for 
sport. The Trust and PPA had formed a close partnership with Pendry, and at the outset it 
appeared that Banks would fulfil a similar role in supporting the organisation. In the first 
instance, the Trust secured a government-endorsed £55 million cash injection; principally 
comprised of English Sport Council and Football Association’s annual allocations of £5 
million per annum for three years to support non-Taylor work, and, Premier League and 
Football Association donations providing a further £5 million over four years for Taylor 
work.73 The boost only partially and temporarily alleviated the consequences of the National 
Lottery; yet, it symbolically renewed government investment and support, and, in the short-
term kept the Trust viable.  
 Labour’s arrival prompted a step change for the Trust that not all its members were 
content about. With new funding, for example, came closer governmental involvement and 
calls for greater stakeholder recognition and representation in the Trust’s administration. 
Where the Premier League, Football Association and Sports Council sought representation 
on the Trust board, Labour went even further with intervening in the administration. With 
Lord Aberdare’s retirement pending, and counter to Aberdare’s own strong 
recommendations for long-serving deputy Richard Faulkner to succeed him, Labour 
appointed Tom Pendry as Trust chairman. Along with Pendry’s appointment the 
government also called for reformation of the Trust deed and an overhaul to its operations 
(to account for the new administration and funding arrangements). In addition, and to the 
PPA’s frustration, the promised concessions to the pools industry also failed to materialise 
in Labour’s 1997 budget.74 For the remainder of 1997 Aberdare endeavoured to support 
Faulkner’s succession to chairman, and with it ensure the continuity to the good work and 
name of the trust, but to no avail. Labour, and in particular Pendry and the Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport (which oversaw the Trust’s activities and its use of government 
funding), ultimately had other designs for the organisation. To note, Pendry did attempt to 
soothe the situation by empathising with Faulkner (but stopped short of supporting his 
desire for an executive position), and, he remained committed to supporting labour’s 
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intentions for institutional change in the Trust and wider football sphere (part of which 
entailed the formation of a new Football Task Force).75 Over the course of mere months the 
Trust went from being an independent, yet government-allied, charitable organisation, to a 
distinct political agenda item in the new Labour administration. 
 The Trust and PPA had courted Labour in hope that the party could facilitate a more 
favourable working environment; in particular, by countering the consequences of long 
experiences of Conservative austerity and the commencement of the National Lottery. 
While the establishment of Blair’s government had brought about a necessary and timely 
financial boost, their new political arrangements had been a double edge sword. The Trust 
may have been economically equipped to fulfil Taylor work commitments and football 
development work to a degree, yet, securing political favour inevitably made them 
susceptible to government changes and priority changes (in this case, the imposition of 
Pendry as chair, and, drastic restructuring imperatives). Over the next two years the 
Football Trust continued with its grant-aid work, however, their demise was largely a fait 
accompli. With Taylor-work nearing completion, pools companies’ support dwindling, the 
government called for further change. Trust members, too, also expressed concerns that 
since Labour’s involvement the culture, ethos, transparency, quality and accountability of 
their organisation and its activities had been significantly comprised, and, ultimately 
undermined the good reputation and respect they had established.76 
While it is possible to lament the demise of the Trust due to political and economic 
shifts, a counter assessment can also be made. The debates around and eventual 
commencement of the national lottery in the early 1990s presented considerable challenges 
for the PPA and Trust and influenced their abilities to achieve their planned objectives. In 
particular, the challenges the organisations faced, and specifically the significant reliance on 
income from pools patronage and intentions to retain autonomy from government 
involvement, made the operational model and administrative structure vulnerable. When 
the consequences of the lottery began to materialise from 1994 onwards and the severe 
income reductions materialised, the Trust and PPA were ill equipped, or, unable to react 
expediently enough to alter their administration and respond effectively to the changing 
environment. The Trust and PPA experienced considerable difficulties after the lottery, 
however, its members remained adamant that their work for football necessitated 
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continued government investment and that based on its long-history of development work 
the Trust should have  a privileged, if not pronounced, place within any new sport 
funding/grant-aid schemes. Moreover, in need of financial security (particularly to ensure 
the completion of Taylor-work), the Trust and PPA also had to rely more so than before of 
its Premier League and Football League contributions. In addition, the professionalization of 
football at the same time had brought new economic streams in the form of lucrative 
television rights and sponsorship deals to football and exacerbated the commercial 
imperatives that underpinned the leagues’ corporate agendas and political relationships 
with the government. In particular, and despite Trust and PPA members’ arguments to the 
contrary, the government appeared reluctant to increase investment into football when it 
was apparent the game was experiencing a significant economic development.77  
Within this context the Trust and PPA endeavoured to retain organisational 
autonomy, however given their increased reliance on both the government and 
stakeholders within the game their continued existence (and autonomy) in their current 
form was in doubt. When the expected political shift eventuated in 1997 it brought some 
hope for the Trust and PPA, but what transpired was confirmation that the arrangement 
remained politically and economically exposed and eventually unsustainable without 
significant alteration and/or restructuring. The Trust evidently had its thoughts on how such 
changes might be able to be made (in the first instance by having Richard Faulkner assume 
Chairmanship of a reconstituted body). Yet, as the government’s responsibilities for 
propping up the Trust increased it clearly felt entitled, and invariably rightly so, to have a 
stronger say in its administration and agendas. What followed from 1997 into the latter 
parts of the decade may have looked like the demise of the Trust and the dissolution of a 
long-standing, worthwhile, valuable institution; however, from the early part of the decade 
the organisation had been largely predisposed to failure (certainly more so than before) and 
its eventual decline became a fait accompli. However hard fought by its members, the 
future of the Trust and the beneficence of government and football stakeholders in assisting 
its work could not be guaranteed by its legacy alone, or, against contextual shifts. The Trust 
may have served a unique purpose in improving stadia and spectatorship cultures and 
developing the game writ large but they could not assume that they were the only 
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organisation capable or mechanism available for developing the game and its infrastructure 
into the future.   
Eventually, in 2000 the organisation was wound up and its activities subsumed 
within the new Football Foundation. For the PPA, the pools remained, but they were unable 
to present competition to the National Lottery. In 2000, primary pools company Littlewoods 
Leisure (which owned the STB competition) was bought for £161 million by Rodime which 
later became Sportech.78 In addition to lottery contributions via the Sport Council and 
professional leagues of the game, Sportech continues to make grant-aid contributions to 
football clubs and community initiatives around the country. What had effectively sustained 
and propelled quality standards in the game for over 20 years had all but evaporated in the 
space of a few short years. Although the catch-all Football Foundation offered a mechanism 
for grant aid delivery (and, particular support for a wider remit of educational and coaching 
related activities), it came at the expense of the disappearance of the Trust, its long-
established relationship with the PPA, and, soured the amiable support both organisations 
had found in Labour since the Trust’s inception in 1975.  
 
Conclusion 
Ultimately, the Trust’s downfall was a consequence of its own success. Throughout the 
latter 1970s and 1980s the Trust had earned legitimacy and power within the football world 
and political sphere through its charitable activities. While the existence and continued 
necessity of the Trust had been borne out of, and further consolidated by, tragedies, by 
embracing its remit to develop and support clubs at all levels of the game, the organisation 
had demonstrated it cultural and civic value beyond being merely a stadia safety grant 
aiding body. Moreover, as fatal events exacerbated their workload, the Trust proved its 
administrative capacities and industry expertise (certainly in terms of ground safety and 
improvement, club management, crowd safety and comfort, and, community engagement). 
The Trust, as with the PPA too, had also shown skill in being able to work relatively 
effectively irrespective of government imperatives or political climates. The Trust’s record of 
success afforded them the respect of football’s stakeholders, and, provided them with a 
recognised public profile and governmental esteem. Yet, in spite of this history, the Trust 
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and PPA were unable to deal with the series of rapid shocks that followed the Hillsborough, 
the Taylor report, the Trust’s reformation, and, the advent of the National Lottery. In spite 
of the Trust’s weighty portfolio of work, in essence, the organisation’s historical legacy 
provided weak defence against what evolved into difficult political and economic conditions. 
All of which compounded to make the partnership that that Trust and PPA had enjoyed 
rather untenable, and, set the pair on a trajectory that belied their contributions to the UK’s 
football environments and spectator experiences writ large.  
Until Labour’s return to office in 1997, the Trust and the PPA had worked in effective 
symbiosis for 22 years. For nearly seven of those years they had collaborated (under closer 
governmental scrutiny) to help implement Taylor work and procure lasting changes in 
football stadia safety and spectator culture. However, while their efforts for the good of the 
game afforded them a modicum of political currency, their ability to function efficiently and 
effectively (and in the Trust’s case exist) remained contingent upon the prevailing 
governmental ether. The Conservatives’ re-election in 1992, for example, had dual 
consequences for the PPA and the Trust. Major had been able to affect minor RBPD changes 
that enabled the pools to continue their Trust contributions. Yet, the government had finally 
approved the introduction of a national lottery scheme that had negatively affected the 
pools relationship with the Trust and the government. For three of these years the PPA had 
continued to support the Trust despite the consequences imposed upon the pools by the 
National Lottery. Although generous, the PPA’s effectively benefited from maintaining their 
commitment to the Trust and its work; politically in terms of representation and 
participation in government sport discussions, economically via tax concessions, and 
publically as a result of their community and civic work. With the re-entrance of Labour in 
1997, the PPA and Trust were again presented with optimism, hope and seductive political 
promises of change. Once more, what they received was only partial satisfaction. While 
Labour oversaw necessary economic investment in sport writ large, there were 
unfortunately inadvertent (or certainly unforeseen) specific compromises for the Trust; 
namely, the loss of administrative power and control, tighter government regulation and 
involvement, personal grievances among long-standing members, the loss of a well-
deserved public profile, and, the end to a respectable quarter-century history as a key 
protagonist of football’s development.  
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